

Common problems in SCADA D.S. Ljungmark

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Who's this guy?

D.S. Ljungmark

- Kernel
- Distributions
- GNOME
- etc.

https://twitter.com/spidler https://github.com/Spindel/ https://gitlab.com/Spindel Systems nerd Security fellow Free Software Fan Opinionated Unixbeard Social Justice Aficionado



Embedded systems

Hardware that's difficult to reach

Sometimes online, sometimes not

- "Lights out Management"
- Train Engine Controller
- SSD wear level controller

Some have stability requirements, others not

- Network hardware (Switches)
- USB connected 3G Modems

Some are constrained, others not

- 8bit PIC
- 16bit DOS (Canon EOS cameras)
- 32bit mips systems with 4Gigs RAM (routers, etc.)



Our Embedded Systems

Beefy little machines

- Fair bit of RAM
- Quite fast ARMv7 cores
- Plenty of Storage
- Connected

In hard to reach places

- Behind locked doors
- Buildings 200km away
- Datacentres

The network is hostile

- Random networks
- No administration
- Bare firewalling



Threats in our business

- Networked access is easy
 - Always on public internet
 - Assume reachable
- Network should not harm neighbours
 - DDoS, reflection, etc.
- Physical access is hard
 - Locked rooms
 - Not public knowledge
- Physical access can do worse
 - No point protecting against physical attacks
- Physical access should not harm other infrastructure
 - No shared credentials
 - No undesirable shared access



Other threats to keep in mind


- Many sources of input
 - Network
 - User
 - Hardware
- Hostile environment
 - Internet is not friendly
 - Facility networks are quirky
- Protect from yourself
 - Internet parts should not bring down SCADA part

Do strict validation!

Performance? Meh. Until DoS




Same as always, but Online






The Same, but Online mk2



MODIO

"It's not a computer"





Hardcoded or default credentials

Wireshark · Follow TCP Stream (tcp.stream eq 27) · cameradome-20161118-04	<u>%_</u> 0		×
PLocalHost login:PProotroot			^
Password: xmhdipc			
.[1;32mWelcome to Monitor Tech[0;39m			
# enable			
enable			
system			
shell			
sh			
-sh: enable: not found			
<pre># /bin/busybox ECCHI</pre>			
system			
-sh: system: not found			
‡ shell			
-sh: shell: not found			
ŧ sh			
<pre># /bin/busybox ECCHI</pre>			
ECCHI: applet not found			
<pre># /bin/busybox ps; /bin/busybox ECCHI</pre>			
/bin/busybox ps; /bin/busybox ECCHI			
PID USER VSZ STAT COMMAND			
1 root 1240 S init			
2 root 0 SW [kthreadd]			
3 root 0 SW [ksoftirqd/0]			
4 root 0 SW [kworker/0:0]			
28 client pkt(s), 1,988 server pkt(s), 852 turns,			
intire conversation (813 kB)		Stream	27 [
nd:		Find N	<u>l</u> ext
Hide this stream Print S	ave as Close	Hel	
	Giose		P




Configuration bugs

UDP Conversations											
ddress A 🛛 🖪	Port A	▲ Address B	 Port B 	🔹 🖣 Packets 🔻 Bytes 🔸	Packets A-B	Bytes A-B 4	Packets A+B 🔸 Byte	s A+B 📢	Rel Start 🛛 🖣	Duration 🖣 bps AB 🔹	bps
18.69.250.27	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	14 758 7 113 35	6 14 758	7 113 356	0	0	0.001695000	9.9336 5728731.6	
5.111.0.148	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	12 562 6 054 88	4 12 562	6 054 884	0	0	0.010440000	9.5057 5095776.6	5
02.10.82.10	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	11 252 5 423 46	4 11 252	5 423 464	0	0	0.004325000	10.0466 4318663.9	3
22.255.125.126	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	10 114 4 874 94	8 10114	4 874 948	0	0	0.003535000	9.9577 3916521.3	7 🗍
08.118.234.238	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	9 154 4 412 22	8 9154	4 412 228	0	0	0.000286000	9.6962 3640372.5	5
4.20.20.40	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	8 880 4 280 16	0 8 880) 4 280 160	0	0	0.016930000	9.6400 3552004.0	5
0.82.78.2	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	8 862 4 271 48	4 8 862	4 271 484	0	0	0.003076000	9.5534 3576928.1	6
93.110.75.146	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	8 861 4 271 00	2 8 861	4 271 002	0	0	0.009293000	9.1673 3727171.7	7
9.53.64.2	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	8 854 4 267 62	8 8854	4 267 628	0	0	0.000683000	9.9346 3436571.0	5
1.124.0.251	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	8 830 4 256 06	0 8830	4 256 060	0	0	0.014518000	9.6221 3538557.3	4
12.227.126.37	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	8 793 4 238 22	6 8.793	4 238 226	0	0	0.004970000	9.4317 3594888.7	5
01.17.1.233	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	8 781 4 232 44	2 8 7 81	4 232 442	0	0	0.000130000	9.7165 3484729.3	្រ
6.197.60.7	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	8 498 4 096 03	6 8 4 98	4 096 036	0	0	0.000149000	9.4364 3472536.8	1
2.227.126.49	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	8 452 4 073 86	4 8.452	4 073 864	0	0	0.000010000	9.5564 3410359.7	5
76.43.250.1	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	8 103 3 905 64	6 8103	3 905 646	0	0	0.000000000	8.5763 3643178.6	6
0.52.196.166	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	7 581 3 654 04	2 7 581	3 654 042	0	0	0.000537000	9.1761 3185720.3	9
2.193.101.138	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	7 572 3 649 70	4 7 572	3 649 704	0	0	0.012389000	9.9591 2931746.1	3
0.75.3.254	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	7 489 3 609 69	8 7489	3 609 698	0	0	0.006899000	9.2697 3115251.5	1
95.10.10.67	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	7 399 3 566 31	8 7 399	3 566 318	0	0	0.013891000	8.4222 3387521.6	4
0.136.209.102	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	7 373 3 553 78	6 7.373	3 553 786	0	0	0.059239000	10.9231 2602772.8	3
5.8.155.55	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	7 369 3 542 06	6 7.369	3 542 066	0	0	0.018782000	9.2379 3067421.2	8
00.52.174.70	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	7 185 3 463 17	0 7185	3 463 170	0	0	0.007794000	9.6491 2871292.5	3
17.12.178.249	ntp	192.168.0.3	http	7 181 3 461 24	2 7 181	3 461 242	0	0	0.002297000	9.0337 3065196.7	4
1 114 2 240	oto	102 140 0 2	http	7 040 2 207 41	0 7.040	0 0 007 410	0	0	0 027400000	0 0102 2001006 0	2
											1



Software Vulnerabilities





Threats faced, summary

- Same as old, without updating threat model
 - From Physical availability to Global availability
- Same as old, but with a pin/password!
 - Fast brute forced
 - Very common
- It's broken but we can't update it
 - Build systems
 - PLC
 - Manual update (screwdriver + programmer)
- Networked, but not designed for Internet
 - Combination of above problems
 - Configuration errors allowing UDP amplification
- Pure bugs & Security bugs
 - Heartbleed
 - Shellshock



Security as a process

- No instant security
- No simple checklist
- Some easy fixes
- Process changes
- Purchaser awareness
- No magic devices



Fixes that don't work

Tell user to change password

Not documenting the root password

Tell user they need a separate firewall

Tell user device should not be on internet

Tell user to update software

Crypto



Fixes: Credentials

No backdoor accounts

No remote accessible defaults

Generate on first startup

Force physical interaction to reset

Rate limit

Hop limit / TTL

(2FA)





Enable updates

Keep building

Social problem, documentation problem

Support software for expected hardware lifetime

Postel's principle is wrong

Windows XP of the future





Enable online & unattended updates

Reduce scope

Secure languages / environments

Disarm classes of bugs

(ASLR, Rust, Modern C++, canaries.)

Enable online configuration changes







Modio team



Sales/ Project management Security expert/ developer

At Modio we know IT-security, we love embedded systems and want them to be secure on the Internet. Our porfolio consists of a number of services that helps our customers and partners to have full control of their solutions through a common web browser at any device. Through our REST-API data can be fetched and included in your web portal or distributed to third parties. Combining secure connections with customer value, so to speak.

